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Abstract. Analysis of more than seven hundred pairs of simultaneous independent
appraisals of institutional-grade commercial properties shows that the standard deviation
of the random component of appraisal error is approximately 2%. Random appraisal
error appears constant across both time and the institutional-grade investment universe,
except during infrequent periods of real estate market gridlock. Most appraisal error is
deterministic in nature, even though it usually appears random in routine cross-sectional
analysis. Such appraisal error can be constrained and reduced by investment
management control systems.
Introduction
A decade ago, real estate researchers began to consider the possibility that investment
statistics derived from appraisal-based commercial real estate valuations might be
much less satisfactory measures of real estate investment performance than
corresponding statistics derived from transactions in the United States stock and bond
markets. The main source for concern was considered to be random appraisal error,
since earlier studies of appraisal error in the residential housing market had suggested
that typical appraisal error is at least 10% of asset capitalization and that most
residential appraisal error is random.1
Since researchers did not have access to large numbers of commercial real estate
appraisals to aid in formulating and testing hypotheses about appraisal valuation
behavior, empirical investigation of commercial real estate appraisal error sources and
their effect on real estate investment statistics was not possible. Accordingly,
researchers used accepted beliefs about residential real estate appraisal accuracy and
aggregate National Council of Real Estate Investment Fiduciaries (NCREIF) statistics
to justify assumptions about the magnitude and random behavior of commercial real
estate appraisal error.2
Unfortunately, in the case of institutional-grade real estate these assumptions neglect
two major differences between commercial property and residential housing:
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institutions purchase property primarily for cash ﬂow and secondarily for capital
appreciation, so the hedonic measures institutions apply to value commercial property
are more uniform than the hedonic measures by which homeowners value residential
housing; and institutional real estate managers usually make real estate investment
decisions on behalf of institutional investors, raising the possibility of agency-based
(nonrandom) contributions to appraisal error usually absent in the case of residential
housing.3
This suggests two likely consequences: commercial real estate appraisal error contains
both random and nonrandom components, and the average magnitude of random
appraisal error in the case of commercial real estate is smaller than the average
magnitude of random residential housing appraisal error. It follows that any
description of the effect of appraisal error on investment statistics should be more
complicated than suggested by previous studies, since random and nonrandom
appraisal error components affect sample means, variances and correlations in very
different ways.
In the absence of access to a fairly large database of commercial real estate appraisals,
it has been impossible for most researchers to determine whether the magnitude of
random appraisal error is large enough to have a material impact on sample real estate
investment statistics. However, even if such access were available, it would only
enable researchers to estimate the magnitude of total appraisal error. Access to
appraisal data alone would not enable researchers to compare the relative importance
of contributions from random and nonrandom error components.
The magnitude of random appraisal error can be determined empirically if an appraisal
database for institutional-grade commercial real estate can be located that includes at
least two simultaneous independent appraisals whenever an appraisal valuation is
updated. One may reasonably conjecture in the case of such data that the deterministic
components of appraisal error are virtually identical for each set of simultaneous
appraisals of each asset.4 If this conjecture or something similar can be tested and
veriﬁed, then it follows that the nonrandom components of the appraisals in each set
of simultaneous appraisals are identical. This implies that the sample standard
deviation for each set of simultaneous appraisals is a sample standard deviation for
the random appraisal error component.
A database of paired simultaneous independent appraisals does exist. Since 1989, The
RREEF Funds has assigned internal personnel to conduct a simultaneous independent
appraisal of each real estate asset whenever an outside appraiser is retained to conduct
a full asset appraisal. Although outside appraisals are no longer conducted as
frequently as they were during the era of closed-end and open-end funds, this still
provides us with a database of 747 pairs of simultaneous independent asset appraisals.5
This study tests a slightly more complex version of the hypothesis that the difference
between simultaneous internal and external appraisals is an estimator for random
appraisal error. The test conﬁrms the hypothesis in a subsequent section, and the
analysis is extended to derive a consistent estimator for the standard deviation ofRANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 35
random appraisal error. Finally, the standard deviation for random appraisal error is
combined with empirical estimates of total appraisal error from previous studies to
measure the average magnitude of nonrandom commercial real estate appraisal error.
Related Research
In the case of residential appraisals, Dotzour (1988a,b) compares appraisals and
purchase prices for more than 500 residential properties acquired by corporate
relocation companies as part of corporate employee relocations.6 Dotzour (1988a)
shows that the mean absolute difference between appraised value and purchase price
is 2.77% for the subsample in which appraisals were performed by professionally
designated appraisers, and 5.13% for the subsample in which appraisals were
performed by nondesignated appraisers.7 Since random appraisal error can be viewed
as a component of the difference between appraised value and purchase price, this
suggests that mean random appraisal error for these subsamples is no larger than the
reported mean absolute difference between appraised value and purchase price.
In the case of commercial real estate appraisals, recent studies implicitly cast light on
the question of random appraisal error in the course of examining related questions.
In other words, random appraisal error is not addressed speciﬁcally, but signiﬁcant
conclusions about random appraisal error follow immediately for anyone who wishes
to extend the analyses in this direction. Of particular interest in this regard are Diaz
(1997) and Diaz and Wolverton (1998). These studies employ a simultaneous appraisal
methodology similar to the one in this study, although each study establishes a
controlled appraisal environment for a single representative property in which far more
simultaneous appraisals are available for each property than are available in the case
of the present study.
Diaz (1997) presents the results of a controlled experiment that, among other things,
examines thirty simultaneous expert appraisals of a single parcel of vacant prepared
industrial-zoned land in the northern Atlanta suburbs. The appraisals are divided into
two subsets of ﬁfteen samples according to the following criterion: appraisals in the
ﬁrst subset were conducted by expert local appraisers with knowledge of the previous
asset appraisal, whereas appraisals in the second subset were conducted by expert
local appraisers who were denied access to previous appraisal results.
Appraisal means, medians and standard deviations for each subset are presented in
Diaz (1997, Exhibit 2). Although these appraisal statistics are presented in absolute
terms (i.e., dollars per acre), each sample standard deviation can be converted to a
relative measurement by dividing the absolute sample standard deviation by the
corresponding sample mean. This yields 2.67% for one ﬁfteen-sample subset and
2.61% for the other ﬁfteen-sample subset.
Of particular signiﬁcance for the present study, these two sample standard deviations
virtually coincide, which strongly suggests that the two appraisal subclasses have the
same true standard deviation for relative random appraisal error.8 Accordingly, the
sample standard deviations can be combined by root-mean-square summation to36 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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produce the following best estimate for relative appraisal error based on the twenty-
eight degrees of freedom in the Diaz data set: s 5 ((2.67%)2 1 (2.61%)2)1/2ù 2.64%.9
This estimate is remarkably close to the value obtained in the present study from a
data set with approximately twenty times as many degrees of freedom.
The follow-on Diaz and Wolverton (1998) study examines, among other things, two
sets of simultaneous expert appraisals of a Phoenix, Arizona apartment complex in
which the groups of appraisals were conducted eight months apart. The ﬁrst set
contains sixteen samples, and the second set contains ﬁfteen samples. In each case,
appraisers were denied knowledge of previous appraisals of the subject asset. These
samples collectively comprise the ‘‘unanchored’’ case in the study.
Sample appraisals are listed in absolute terms in Diaz and Wolverton (1998, Table 1).
It is straightforward to derive sample standard deviations in relative terms for each
set of simultaneous appraisals by computing sample standard deviations for the natural
logarithms of the appraisals rather than for the appraisals themselves. This yields
5.32% for the standard deviation of the sixteen-sample set and 5.06% for the standard
deviation of the ﬁfteen-sample set.
The corresponding sample means imply with virtual certainty that the true means for
the two cases are not identical.10 By contrast, the proximity of the sample standard
deviations suggests once again that the corresponding true standard deviations of
relative random appraisal error are identical.11 Accordingly, the sample standard
deviations can be combined by weighted root-mean-square summation to produce the
following best estimate for relative appraisal error based on the 29 degrees of freedom
in the Diaz and Wolverton unanchored appraisal data set: s 5 ((15*(5.32%)2 1
14*(5.06%)2)/29)1/2 ù 5.20%.12
The Diaz and Wolverton study also lists updates of ﬁfteen of the sixteen appraisals
in the ﬁrst sample set that were conducted at the same time as the appraisals in the
second set. These appraisal updates were conducted by ﬁfteen appraisers involved in
the ﬁrst group of appraisals, and comprise the ‘‘anchored’’ case of the study. The
study shows that the ﬁrst appraisals were a statistically signiﬁcant psychological
‘‘anchor’’ for near-term valuations that prevented the same appraisers from fully
responding to changes in true asset value. This conﬁrms the longstanding hypothesis
that appraisal anchoring is a statistically signiﬁcant problem with respect to near-term
reappraisals by the same appraisers, and suggests that institutional investors should
strongly consider the establishment of valuation policy controls to minimize any
anchoring effects.
Interestingly from the perspective of the present study, the sample standard deviation
of relative appraisal error for appraisal updates in the Diaz and Wolverton study is
6.90%. This is substantially larger than the 5.20% sample standard deviation for
relative appraisal error in the case of the thirty-one original (i.e., unanchored)
appraisals, and is on the edge of being statistically distinguishable from the
unanchored value.13 In fact, the 90% conﬁdence interval for the true standard deviationRANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 37
of relative appraisal error conditioned on the 5.20% sample standard deviation based
on 29 degrees of freedom is (4.29%, 6.65%).14
Random appraisal error estimated from the Diaz and Wolverton (1998) data appears
signiﬁcantly larger than appraisal error estimated either from the Diaz (1997) data or
from data in the present study. There are two apparent explanations for larger appraisal
error in the case of the Diaz and Wolverton study. First, the subject asset of the Diaz
and Wolverton study is in Phoenix although the appraisers practice in Atlanta, whereas
appraisers in the cases of Diaz (1997) and the present study are active in the markets
that contain the subject assets. Second, apartment property may be more difﬁcult to
appraise accurately than ofﬁce, industrial and retail property, due to shorter average
leases and less creditworthy tenants. This suggests additional experiments of the Diaz
and Wolverton type to determine whether appraisal expertise is immediately and fully
transferable across geographical regions, and whether major differences in average
lease maturity or credit quality have any effect on the magnitude of random appraisal
error.15
Signiﬁcantly larger estimates of the magnitude of random appraisal error appear in
several other studies, including one conducted in part by the authors of the present
study. For example, Geltner, Graff and Young (1994) derives an algebraic model that
relates variances for three types of unobservable random noise connected with real
estate investment returns, and also hypothesizes a range of reasonable values for the
unknown parameters in the model. These unknown parameters include the standard
deviation for random appraisal error. Similarly, Geltner and Goetzmann (1998) derive
an error estimate for the total magnitude of several types of appraisal error as an
incidental result of a repeated-measures regression study of appraisal-based index
volatility. Then the study applies a second-stage regression to separate random
appraisal error from the other appraisal error components. Both studies apply their
respective models to NCREIF appraisal-based returns. Geltner (1998) also addresses
random appraisal error, but relies primarily on Geltner, Graff and Young (1994) for
quantitative support.
Geltner, Graff and Young (1994) and Geltner and Goetzmann (1998) both require
disaggregated NCREIF appraisal-based return series to be serially independent and
identically distributed in order for their conclusions about random appraisal error to
be supportable. Although analyses in these studies could conceivably be robust with
respect to small nonstationarities in return series, major nonstationarities (such as
result from real estate investment cycles) in the return series would invalidate the
quantitative appraisal error conclusions in both studies.16 In addition, the analysis in
Geltner, Graff and Young (1994) depends upon the restrictive assumption common to
early appraisal error studies that all appraisal error is unbiased and random.
Young and Graff (1995) shows empirically that disaggregated NCREIF appraisal-
based returns are extremely nonstationary. The investment characteristics of real estate
appraisal-based returns observed in Young and Graff are also observed in Graff,
Harrington and Young (1997) for appraisal-based returns from the Australian real38 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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estate market compiled by the Property Council of Australia, suggesting that
investment return nonstationarity is a ubiquitous feature of commercial real estate
markets.
This does not imply that the results of Geltner, Graff and Young (1994), Geltner and
Goetzmann (1998) and Geltner (1998) are without interest or signiﬁcance. However,
since the results of these studies depend critically on overly restrictive assumptions
about stationarity in investment returns and randomness in total appraisal error, they
cannot be accorded the same credence as studies such as Diaz (1997), Diaz and
Wolverton (1998) and the present study, in which analyses are largely nonparametric
and are consequently unaffected by time dependencies in investment returns and
nonrandom components in appraisal error.
Finally, three recent studies relate to the present study by showing empirically that
nonrandom appraisal error components affect commercial real estate valuations and
investment returns, and that agency costs are probable sources for the nonrandom
error. First, Hendershott and Kane (1995) examines the ofﬁce property capital gains
component of the Russell-NCREIF Property Index and demonstrates systematic
appraisal overvaluation of institutional-grade ofﬁce properties throughout the second
half of the 1980s. The study attributes this nonrandom appraisal error to two sources:
an imputed reluctance on the part of appraisers to recognize sudden large valuation
changes, and a certain type of agency cost—more precisely, investment manager
pressure to maintain high property valuations in order to avoid reductions in
percentage-based investment management fees. Next, Graff and Webb (1997) presents
evidence that agency costs embedded in transaction prices introduce nonrandom
components into appraisal error that generate statistically signiﬁcant performance
persistence in NCREIF annual appraisal-based investment returns. The Graff and
Webb study also suggests how excessive agency costs can be detected and eliminated
by appropriately structured management control systems. Finally, Wolverton and
Gallimore (1998) examines commercial mortgage lending and demonstrates that client
feedback exerts statistically signiﬁcant material effects on appraisal valuation just prior
to pending sales, and that the effects can become coercive in extent.17
Data Description
Data for this study consist of 747 pairs of simultaneous independent valuations of
commercial ofﬁce, retail, industrial and apartment properties during the 1989–1997
period.
In the case of each set of paired valuations, one is an internal valuation conducted by
RREEF portfolio managers and research analysts, and the other is a full appraisal
conducted by an external third-party fee appraiser hired either directly by the relevant
RREEF client (in the case of properties in designated separate accounts) or else by
RREEF.
In every case, internal RREEF staffers and outside appraisers are given the same
factual information about property operating expenses, budgets, ﬁnancial statementsRANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 39
and rent rolls. In order to minimize appraisal anchoring effects, outside appraisers are
not informed of prior valuations, either internal or external. However, since outside
appraisers sometimes value the same property over several years, individual outside
appraisers may have knowledge of prior appraisals. The RREEF database does not
contain information that would allow us to assess the incidence of occurrences in
which outside appraisers do in fact know the previous valuations. Internal appraisers
can access prior valuations if they are so inclined.
Since inside and outside valuations of each property take place at the same time,
inside valuations are completed before the corresponding outside valuations in
approximately one-half of the cases. Thus, about one-half of the time inside appraisers
are aware of the current outside valuation before the inside valuation is completed.
In determining property value for reporting or fee assessment purposes, RREEF
generally uses the lower of the two appraisals. More precisely, RREEF accepts the
lower of the two appraisals unless the RREEF valuation is less than 5% lower than
the external appraisal, in which case the outside appraisal is used.
The desire for an independent check on outside appraisals ﬁrst arose in 1987 when
RREEF noticed weakness in the re-leasing market for oil patch properties that RREEF
perceived as a warning signal of declining values. RREEF discovered that outside
appraisers were unwilling to attribute as much signiﬁcance to the impact of this
development on oil patch property values as RREEF believed to be appropriate.
Concern that systematic appraisal overvaluation of oil patch property would result in
ultimately unjustiﬁable portfolio fees led to the creation of portfolio management and
research groups and the accompanying system of internal appraisal checks. Also,
RREEF changed the cycle of property appraisals in its closed-end real estate funds
from fourth-quarter valuations to a more evenly balanced distribution across all four
calendar quarters.
Methodology
This objective of this study is to examine the contribution of random appraisal error
to uncertainty in relative asset value. Accordingly, each appraisal sample in the
analysis is the natural logarithm of actual appraised asset value, and appraisal error
is deﬁned to be the difference between the natural logarithms of appraised asset value
and true asset value. Expressed symbolically:
ln(V*) 5 ln(V) 1 d, (1)
where V* is an appraisal value for an asset, V is the true value of the asset as of the
appraisal date and d is the (total relative) appraisal error.18
The assumption that the probability distribution for random appraisal error reﬂects
epistemological limitations on the accuracy of appraisal methodology suggests that
the probability distribution for relative random appraisal error may be constant across
both time and the universe of real estate assets in the case of full appraisals by40 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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professionally designated appraisers.19 Accordingly, our null hypothesis tests this
possibility. More precisely, our null hypothesis consists of the hypothesis that
(relative) appraisal error may be represented as the sum of two components: a random
sample from a normal distribution with zero mean that is constant across both time
and the institutional-grade real estate universe, and a deterministic component that is
constant across simultaneous appraisals for individual assets but that can vary across
both time and the real estate asset universe.20
The null hypothesis is summarized by the following equation:
ln(V*(p,t,n)) 5 ln(V(p,t)) 1 e(p,t,n) 1 h(p,t), (2)
where V(p,t) is the true value of property p at time t, V*(p,t,n) is the appraisal value
for property p at time t derived by appraiser n, e(p,t,n) is the random appraisal error
component and h(p,t) is the deterministic/nonrandom appraisal error component. Note
that Equation (2) is essentially the same as Equation (1), except that total appraisal
error d(p,t,n) has been decomposed into e(p,t,n) 1 h(p,t) and restrictions have been
imposed on the form of total appraisal error via restrictions on each of the
components.21
The deterministic component h(p,t) reﬂects a panoply of asset-speciﬁc and time-
varying effects relating to agency costs. Consequently, the distribution of the function
values of the deterministic component appears consistent with the distribution of a
random variable when subjected to cross-sectional analysis.22
The assumption that e(p,t,n) is a random sample from a probability distribution that
does not vary with time, property or appraiser implies that s(e(p,t,n)) [ s(e) is the
same for all appraisals. Together with the assumption that simultaneous appraisals of
the same asset have the same deterministic component, this implies that a set of
sample standard deviations for simultaneous appraisals of individual assets constitutes
a set of sample standard deviations for random appraisal error.23
Although each sample standard deviation is based only on the information available
from simultaneous appraisals of a single asset, an estimate for the standard deviation
of random appraisal error that incorporates information available from all appraisals
in the data set can be obtained from the distribution of the sample standard
deviations.24
If the null hypothesis is not correct, the essential aspects of this analysis may remain
valid with appropriate modiﬁcations. For example, if the deterministic components of
simultaneous appraisals of individual assets are not identical, then each expected
sample variance for simultaneous appraisals of the same asset is an upper bound for
the variance of random appraisal error. With a corresponding modiﬁcation in the
interpretation of ‘sample standard deviation’ for each appraisal pair, the analysis in
this study can be shown to generate a consistent estimator for an upper bound for the
standard deviation of random appraisal error.RANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 41
The null hypothesis can be tested in two ways. First, if the null hypothesis is correct
then the true probability is exactly 50% that each external appraisal of RREEF-
managed assets is greater than the corresponding simultaneous internal RREEF
appraisal. Furthermore, the null hypothesis implies that the set of differences between
simultaneous paired appraisals constitutes a set of independent samples. Consequently,
if the null hypothesis is correct then it follows that the incidence of samples in which
the external appraisal is greater than the corresponding internal appraisal is binomially
distributed around 50%.25
Second, if the null hypothesis is correct in assuming the magnitude of random
appraisal error to be independent of time, asset and appraiser, then the distribution of
standard deviations for pairs of simultaneous asset appraisals should be substantially
unchanged for selected subsets of the total sample set. Accordingly, the distribution
of sample standard deviations for appraisal pairs from each individual year in the test
interval is examined separately for evidence of time-varying behavior.26
It is also useful to recall that some investigators assert that there are differences
between investment return behavior for large-capitalization and small-capitalization
real estate assets. Since the midpoint of the appraisal set is $10.67 million, the
assertions about differences between large-capitalization and small-capitalization data
and the independence of random appraisal error can be tested jointly by dividing the
data into above-median-capitalization and below-median-capitalization subsets (i.e.,
large-capitalization and small-capitalization subsets) and performing the tests on each
subset.
Empirical Results
Selected descriptive characteristics of the sample distribution for the entire sample set
and several subsets are presented in Exhibit 1. The incidence of paired appraisal
samples in which external appraisals exceed internal appraisals is presented in Exhibit
2.
Exhibit 1 reveals year-by-year variations in sample standard deviation means and
percentile levels that do not support the null hypothesis. The ratio of maximum-to-
minimum sample standard deviations for ﬁxed year-by-year percentile levels varies
from more than three-to-one for median standard deviations to nearly six-to-one for
90th percentile standard deviations, which does not appear particularly time-
independent. Even worse, the aggregated data have a median sample standard
deviation of only 1.69% plus at least four sample standard deviations above 22%,
which cannot be considered consistent with time-independent sample standard
deviations for any reasonable distribution.
When data for 1991–1992 are omitted, the ratio of maximum-to-minimum sample
standard deviations for ﬁxed annual percentile levels declines in every case to a value
of approximately two-to-one, which is more nearly consistent with the assumption





















































Percentile Levels, Minima, Maxima and Means for Distributions of Sample Standard Deviations for Pairs of
Simultaneous Asset Appraisals













1989 0.23 1.02 1.88 2.25 5.22 6.50
1990 0.00 2.08 3.29 4.48 6.97 22.01
1991 0.00 3.63 5.98 7.22 13.07 63.04
1992 0.00 3.71 7.33 9.61 20.34 37.07
1993 0.00 1.69 2.96 3.60 8.06 15.70
1994 0.00 1.55 2.60 2.91 4.46 43.26
1995 0.00 1.03 1.42 2.12 3.52 6.08
1996 0.00 1.08 2.08 3.36 5.45 13.75
1997 0.00 1.30 1.96 2.68 5.15 16.44
All Years, 1989–1997 0.00 1.69 3.26 3.63 7.17 63.04
All Years Except 1991–1992 0.00 1.35 2.27 2.99 5.27 43.26
Capitalization . Median,
All Years, 1989–1997 0.00
1.35 2.99 3.37 6.60 43.26
Capitalization . Median,
All Years Except 1991–1992




0.00 1.99 3.53 3.94 7.57 63.04
Capitalization # Median,
All Years Except 1991–1992






















































Incidence of Internal Appraisals That Are Less Than External Appraisals







for s # Median
(%)
Internal , External
for s . Median
(%)
1989 16 50.0 62.5 37.5
1990 53 64.2 44.4 84.6***
1991 84 79.8**** 69.0* 90.5****
1992 85 80.0**** 67.4* 92.9****
1993 81 74.1*** 68.3* 80.0***
1994 114 66.7*** 64.9* 68.4**
1995 103 61.2* 51.9 70.6**
1996 87 50.6 25.0** 76.7***
1997 124 47.6 38.7 56.5
All Years, 1989–1997 747 64.1***** 54.0 74.3*****
All Years Except 1991–1992 578 59.5*** 49.8 69.2*****
Capitalization . Median,
All Years, 1989–1997
373 61.1*** 46.2 75.9*****
Capitalization . Median,
All Years Except 1991–1992
289 56.4* 47.2 65.5***
Capitalization # Median,
All Years, 1989–1997
374 67.1***** 56.1 78.1*****
Capitalization # Median,
All Years Except 1991–1992
289 62.6*** 55.6 69.7***
*Null hypothesis rejected at the 5% signiﬁcance level.
**Null hypothesis rejected at the 1% signiﬁcance level.
***Null hypothesis rejected at the 0.1% signiﬁcance level.
****Null hypothesis rejected at the 0.00001% signiﬁcance level.
*****Null hypothesis rejected at the 0.0000001% signiﬁcance level.44 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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However, the aggregated data again have a median sample standard deviation of only
1.35% plus at least two sample standard deviations above 22%, which still is not
consistent with time-independent sample standard deviations.
Exhibit 2 is equally discouraging at ﬁrst glance for the null hypothesis. The null
hypothesis implies a probability of 50% for the proposition that the difference between
external and internal appraisals is positive. Unfortunately, the exhibit shows that the
test rejects the proposition for ﬁve of the nine years in the test interval, rejects the
proposition in all six cases of aggregated annual data, and rejects the proposition
deﬁnitively at the 0.1% level or lower in nine of the ﬁfteen cases examined.
The evidence is more encouraging when the appraisal pairs are separated into subsets
of above-median and below-median sample standard deviations. Exhibit 2 shows that
test rejections of the proposition can be explained completely by the contribution to
the test statistic from paired appraisals with sample standard deviations above the
median value. In the case of appraisal pairs with sample standard deviations at or
below the median sample standard deviation, the test statistic is consistent with the
null hypothesis in every case involving aggregated data.28
This suggests that the null hypothesis is consistent with the data for properties that
are relatively uncomplicated to appraise. This suggests in turn that the null hypothesis
could well be correct for most institutional-grade properties under most circumstances,
but that there is some exceptional agency effect that is clouding the RREEF data for
properties that have greater-than-average investment risk.29
An explanation consistent with this suggestion is apparent when we recall the original
RREEF concern that motivated the introduction of internal appraisals. As discussed
earlier, RREEF management was concerned that downside risk was not being fully
factored into independent asset appraisals, and that this could generate valuation-based
management fees that might ultimately appear unjustiﬁed by clients if projected worst-
case investment scenarios turned out to be correct. RREEF staffers who perform the
internal appraisals are certainly aware of the motivation for internal appraisals.
Although encouraged toward objectivity in their valuations, they can also be
hypothesized to display a tendency toward conservatism in cases that represent
unusually large investment risk, a tendency that would not be expected from
corresponding external appraisers.30
A related source for upward bias in external appraisals relative to internal appraisals
under some economic scenarios is reluctance on the part of external appraisers to
incorporate expected sources of declining value into appraisals before the declines
actually materialize.31
The results of the data analysis are consistent with these explanations. Exhibit 2 shows
the incidence of paired appraisal samples in which external appraisals exceed internal
appraisals to be greater than 50% for all ﬁfteen tests involving sets of sample standard
deviations that exceed the median standard deviation (i.e., in which the appraised
assets involve greater-than-average investment risk). Furthermore, the test values areRANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 45
statistically signiﬁcant in thirteen of the ﬁfteen cases at the 1% level or lower, and
are signiﬁcant in all six cases of aggregated data at the 0.1% level or lower.
This suggests that, although the null hypothesis appears correct in the case of the
RREEF data for sets of sample standard deviations that do not exceed the median
standard deviation, in general the deterministic component of appraisal error can be
expected to vary across the appraiser universe as well as across time and the real
estate asset universe.
Nonetheless, it is possible to estimate the standard deviation of random appraisal error
empirically from the data. This estimate is not completely straightforward, because
our test has rejected the null hypothesis for the upper half of the distribution of sample
standard deviations. More precisely, the analysis thus far has shown that the upper
half of the distribution of sample standard deviations for simultaneous appraisal pairs
is biased upward relative to the corresponding distribution of sample standard
deviations for random appraisal error. It follows that the expected mean value of
sample standard deviations for simultaneous appraisal pairs is strictly larger than the
expected mean value of the corresponding sample standard deviations for random
appraisal error.
However, the test results have conﬁrmed that the data are consistent with the
assumption that the lower half of the distribution of sample standard deviations for
simultaneous appraisal pairs is identical to the lower half of the corresponding
distribution for sample standard deviations of random appraisal error. This conclusion,
together with the assumption of normality for random appraisal error, can be applied
to circumvent the problem that the upper half of the distribution of sample standard
deviations for random appraisal error is not observable.
In particular, a consistent estimator for the true standard deviation of random appraisal
error can be constructed from the observation that the sample median for the
distribution of sample standard deviations for simultaneous appraisal pairs is a
consistent estimator for the true median of the distribution. Hence, the sample median
for this distribution is also a consistent estimator for the true median of the distribution
of sample standard deviations for random appraisal error. For a normal distribution,
the ratio of the true standard deviation to the true median for the distribution of sample
standard deviations is 1.4826027 to eight signiﬁcant ﬁgures.32 It follows that, in the
case of normally distributed random appraisal error, the sample median for the
distribution of sample standard deviations of simultaneous appraisal pairs multiplied
by 1.4826027 is a consistent estimator for the true standard deviation of random
appraisal error.
We select the aggregate set of appraisal pairs that excludes the 1991–1992 data for
the median standard deviation estimate, since as discussed earlier the year-by-year
cross-sectional distributions for the entire data set appear time-dependent due to the
inclusion of exceptionally noisy 1991–1992 data.33 Thus, Exhibit 1 implies the best
estimate for the standard deviation of random appraisal error based on the available
data to be 1.4826027*1.35% ù 2.00%. To this determination must be added the46 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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qualiﬁcation that the standard deviation will be slightly larger and possibly also asset-
dependent during occasional periods of extreme transactional market gridlock, such
as occurred during 1991–1992 and at the beginning of the 1970s.34
Although the differences between the medians in Exhibit 1 are not large, sample
medians for the six aggregated data sets suggest that random appraisal error for large-
capitalization properties is likely to be marginally smaller than random appraisal error
for small-capitalization properties, if the standard deviation of random appraisal error
is not asset-independent. Thus, the 2.00% estimate for the standard deviation of
random appraisal error may be upwardly biased in the case of large-capitalization
assets.
Finally, any point estimate of a parameter should be accompanied by some information
about the accuracy of the estimate. Since the standard deviation of random appraisal
error is estimated by multiplying the point estimate for the median of the sample
standard deviations by 1.4826027, it follows that standard error for the former
parameter equals the standard error for the latter parameter multiplied by 1.4826027.
Standard error for the sample median of the sample standard deviations can in turn
be estimated by a general result on the asymptotic standard error of quantile estimators
for large sample sizes.
The general result shows that the variance of a sample quantile jp of order p for a
cumulative distribution with a probability density function ƒ is given asymptotically
by var(jp) ù pq/(n(ƒ(jp)2) for large sample sizes n, where p is any proper fraction
between 0 and 1, q 5 1 2 p, and ƒ is continuous and positive at jp.35
In the case of the sample median of sample standard deviations with one degree of
freedom, p 5 q 5 0.5, and ƒ(j0.5) ù 47.078018/n. Exhibit 2 shows that the median
of the distribution of sample standard deviations is estimated from 578 samples. It
follows that var(j0.5) ù 0.00011280/n ù 0.0000001952, and thus that s(j0.5) ù
0.000442 5 0.0442%.
This estimate can be considered a lower bound for the standard error of the sample
median in the case of large sample sizes. However, the estimate does not account for
all random error sources that contribute to the sample median in the case of the data
for this study. Derivation of the above asymptotic formula for the variance of a
quantile depends on the hypothesis that the sample distribution contains n independent
samples from the probability distribution, a hypothesis that the binomial test rejected
in the case of above-median sample standard deviations for the appraisal pair data.
Thus, an adjustment to the standard error is almost certainly necessary to account for
uncertainty in the sample median due to upward bias in some above-median samples.
Additional research remains to be done on this problem.
Conclusion
Pairs of simultaneous independent appraisals for the same commercial real estate
assets can be used to isolate the random component of appraisal error for institutional-RANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 47
grade real estate. Data of this type collected since 1989 shows that the standard
deviation of random appraisal error is approximately 2%, except during infrequent
periods of transactional market gridlock that occur every couple of decades. This
suggests that appraisal methodology applied by professional appraisers to institutional-
grade real estate is potentially more accurate than previously supposed by investment
industry observers.36
Investor and investment manager views of the impact of random appraisal error on
asset valuation can have a material impact upon the structure of institutional real estate
portfolios. Widely accepted perception that the contribution of random appraisal error
to portfolio valuation is relatively signiﬁcant has encouraged the belief that only large
diverse portfolios can be valued accurately by appraisal methodology. This has
provided both institutional investors and investment managers with incentives to
assemble large diverse real estate portfolios, even though incremental agency costs
associated with creating and holding an array of properties diversiﬁed by property
type and geographical region could well be substantial.37
The standard deviation of random appraisal error obtained in this study becomes
particularly signiﬁcant when combined with the results of studies such as Cole,
Guilkey and Miles (1986) and Miles, Guilkey, Webb and Hunter (1991) that determine
the typical magnitude of total appraisal error to be approximately 10% of appraised
value. The joint implication of these studies is that most appraisal error is
deterministic. However, deterministic appraisal error is highly nonlinear and appears
random when subjected to routine cross-sectional analysis. Since the deterministic
component of appraisal error appears randomly distributed for purposes of cross-
sectional analysis, the quadratic formula for subtraction of variances shows that
virtually all cross-sectional variance in appraisal error observed in previous studies is
due to the contribution of the deterministic component.38
This conclusion has material consequences for institutional investors. Random error
represents the combined effect of a virtually inﬁnite number of largely independent
inputs, each of which has such an insigniﬁcant impact by itself that individual effects
are impossible to detect. By contrast, deterministic error represents the impact of a
ﬁnite number of inputs, each of which can in principle be identiﬁed, constrained and
controlled; and once controlled they can be reduced, and possibly even eliminated.39
Thus, this study provides evidence that previous appraisal research has inadvertently
encouraged investor tolerance of excessive agency costs by misinterpreting the
aggregate statistical effect of these costs as random error.
This suggests a basic shortcoming in top-down real estate portfolio strategies:
informationally efﬁcient asset pricing is not automatically available to real estate
investors through routine operation of market-based mechanisms. Inattention to asset
pricing can impose a signiﬁcant penalty on subsequent portfolio returns. In order to
avoid excessive agency costs, signiﬁcant investor attention must necessarily be devoted
to asset valuation during investment acquisitions and disposals, or at least to the
imposition and implementation of investor-oriented controls on the asset valuation
process.48 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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Asset pricing takes care of itself in liquid markets, where well-informed investors
supported by a continuously ﬂowing stream of economic information about market
assets that is protected by authorities such as the Securities and Exchange Commission
and the Financial Accounting Standards Board generate informationally efﬁcient
market prices. In such cases, investors have the luxury of focusing on secondary
strategic investment issues such as efﬁcient portfolio diversiﬁcation. However, in an
illiquid market without any overseeing authority, a bottom-up approach to asset
selection and portfolio construction is a practical consequence of the need for investors
to minimize the impact of deterministic inﬂuences on the asset valuation process.
Notes
1 Data for pre-1980 empirical studies in housing economics usually were based wholly or in
part on owner estimates of market value. For example, Kish and Lansing (1954) and Kain and
Quigley (1972) compare residential valuations by appraisers and owner-occupants. The studies
suggest that the nonrandom component of valuation error is much smaller than the random
component and of marginal statistical signiﬁcance. Data from the studies can be used easily to
infer that the standard deviation of appraisal error is between 15% and 20% if valuations by
appraisers and owners are equally accurate, or somewhat smaller if appraiser valuations are
more accurate than owner valuations. In addition, the studies rely on simpliﬁed appraisals rather
than full appraisals, so random appraisal error in this data may be larger than in the case of
full appraisals by professionally designated appraisers. In a related study, Robins and West
(1977) apply a hedonic model to similar data and suggest that the standard deviation of appraisal
error is about 12%. However, the deﬁnition of appraisal error in this study includes any appraisal
components explainable by variables not included in the model.
2 Initial research studies supported the hypothesis that housing and commercial property
appraisal error are similar. For example, Cole, Guilkey and Miles (1986) report the mean
absolute difference between transaction prices and immediately preceding external appraisals
for assets in the NCREIF database to be 9.5% of appraised value, and Miles, Guilkey, Webb
and Hunter (1991) update the estimate to 10.7% for the mean absolute difference between
transaction prices for NCREIF assets and reported appraisal values for the calendar quarter
immediately preceding the quarter of each corresponding transaction. However, the reported
values include the combined effects of instantaneous transaction error, instantaneous appraisal
error and temporal aggregation error (e.g., see Geltner, Graff and Young, 1994; and Geltner,
1993).
3 This is not to suggest that residential appraisals are immune from pressures to value agency
costs, only that there are fewer sources for such pressures than in the case of commercial real
estate appraisals. For example, Ferguson (1988) presents statistically signiﬁcant empirical
evidence that appraisers are susceptible to agency cost pressure to inject upward bias into
residential appraisals conducted for mortgage lenders as part of the loan application evaluation
process in order to justify previously negotiated prices in purchase contracts. The study also
shows that upward bias is statistically more likely in appraisals conducted for lenders by
independent appraisers than in appraisals conducted by in-house staff.
4 If the conjecture is not correct, then it still follows that the sample standard deviation for the
pair of simultaneous appraisals is an upper bound for the magnitude of the random component
of appraisal error. However, in this case it is unlikely that the distribution of sample standard
deviations for pairs of simultaneous appraisals would appear to be stationary, since it is probable
that the average magnitude of nonrandom appraisal error varies with time.RANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 49
5 In recent years, the focus of pension plan real estate investments has shifted away from
commingled funds and toward dedicated separate investment manager accounts, each wholly
owned by a single plan sponsor. To reduce expenses, many public plan sponsors require outside
appraisal of assets in dedicated separate accounts as infrequently as once every three years.
Nevertheless, some investment managers of these accounts conduct annual internal appraisals
of all assets for reporting and decision-making purposes.
6 Appraisal in these situations precedes negotiation of a sale contract, so agency pressure for
upward bias to justify a previously negotiated contract price is absent, cf. Note 3. Dotzour
(1988b) continues examination of the data set and shows that appraisals in the sample are on
average unbiased, although several subsamples (deﬁned by economic geographical region, or
calendar quarter in which properties were sold) display evidence of statistically signiﬁcant
appraisal bias.
7 The Dotzour (1988a) study shows that the difference between the accuracies suggested by the
two sample values is statistically signiﬁcant. This suggests that, in the absence of agency cost
pressures, full residential appraisals by professionally designated appraisers are usually more
accurate than full residential appraisals by nondesignated appraisers.
8 The description of the appraisal environment implies that sample appraisal variances in the
subclasses are independent. Under the assumption that each subclass is normally distributed,
the F distribution can be applied to test the hypothesis that the two subclasses have the same
true standard deviation. The ratio of the sample variances is (2.67/2.61)2 ù 1.045 , 1.073 ù
F.55(14,14), where 14 is the number of degrees of freedom in both the numerator and the
denominator. This implies acceptance of the null hypothesis at the 90% signiﬁcance level. In
other words, even under the null hypothesis there is a 90% probability that randomly generated
sample variances for two subclasses with 14 degrees of freedom in each subclass will differ by
more than the Diaz sample variances.
9 A relative appraisal error estimate with 29 degrees of freedom can be derived with respect to
a single combined sample mean if the true distributional means for the two appraisal subclasses
are identical, a hypothesis tested and accepted in the Diaz study. First, the combined sample
mean m0 is computed as the average of the two sample means m1 and m2 for the individual
subclasses. Next, the absolute sample variance s for the combined appraisal sample is 2
0
decomposed by two-way analysis of variance into the sum of within-subclass and between-
subclass variances by the following equation: (2n 2 1)s 5 (2n 2 2)s 1 (n)s 5 (n 2 1)s 1 22 2 2
0 wb 1
(n 2 1)s 1 (2n)(mi 2 m0)2, where n is the number of samples in each subclass, s and s are 2 22
2 12
the individual subclass variances, the within-subclass variance s is the average (s 1 s )/2 of 22 2
w 12
the individual subclass variances, mi may be either of the two subclass sample means, and the
between-subclass variance s is equal to 2(mi 2 m0)
2. By numerically evaluating the 2
b
expression for between-subclass variance, it is easily seen that s ,, min(s , s ). It follows 22 2
b 12
from the analysis of variance equation that s , min(s , s ), and similarly that relative appraisal 22 2
01 2
error for the combined sample is less than the minimum subclass relative appraisal error. Finally,
the value of relative appraisal error with 29 degrees of freedom is estimated to be s0/m0 ù
2.60%, which is conﬁrmed by direct comparison to be less than the relative appraisal error
estimate for each subclass.
10 The sample means of the natural logarithms of the appraisals are 8.3673 and 8.2904, so the
difference between the sample means is 0.0769. The sample standard deviation for the difference
between sample means is s ù ((0.0532)2/15 1 (0.0504)2/14)1/2 ù 0.0193. Thus the t-Statistic
for the difference between the sample means is 0.0769/0.0193 ù 3.9845, which implies that
the equality hypothesis for the true means of the natural logarithms of the appraisals is rejected
at the 0.01% signiﬁcance level.50 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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11 Diaz and Wolverton (1998, Figure 1) plots cumulative distributions for the two unanchored
appraisal sets. The study observes that the shapes of the two distributions are virtually identical.
12 The description of the appraisal environment implies that the sample appraisal variances for
the two sets are independent. The W9 approximation to the Shapiro-Wilk W test (see Shapiro
and Francia, 1972) implies that logarithmic normality for the appraisal distributions is accepted
at the 10% signiﬁcance level in the case of the sixteen-sample set and at the 3% signiﬁcance
level in the case of the ﬁfteen-sample set. Thus, the F distribution can be applied to test the
hypothesis that the two sets have the same standard deviation. The sample variance ratio is
(5.32/5.04)2 ù 1.105 , 1.110 ù F.575(15,14). This implies acceptance of the null hypothesis
at the 85% signiﬁcance level.
13 The observation that relative appraisal error for anchored appraisals in the Diaz and Wolverton
(1998) data set is larger than relative appraisal error for the unanchored appraisals contradicts
the predictions of most appraisal-smoothing studies. However, this empirical result is consistent
with recent theoretical results in Lai and Wang (1998), which implies that appraisal anchoring
exaggerates rather than diminishes many quadratic investment statistics.
14 Derivation of the conﬁdence interval for the true standard deviation then follows from the
observation that sample variance for a normal distribution has a chi-square distribution, e.g.,
see Snedecor and Cochran (1989). The Shapiro-Francia W9 test implies that logarithmic
normality for the anchored appraisals is accepted at the 10% signiﬁcance level. The ratio of the
sample variances is (6.90/5.20)2 ù 1.762 . 1.745 ù F.90(14,29), which implies rejection of the
equality hypothesis for the true standard deviations of the anchored and unanchored appraisals
at the 80% signiﬁcance level cf. Notes 8 and 12.
15 See Graff and Cashdan (1990), Graff (1992) and Graff and Webb (1997) for discussions of
the impact of average lease maturity and tenant creditworthiness on real estate investment
characteristics.
16 the case of Geltner and Goetzmann (1998), stationarity in returns is essential for the second
stage regression designed to separate random appraisal error from other appraisal error
components. More precisely, this regression requires among other things that ex ante (i.e.,
expected) variance of investment return between appraisals be linearly proportional to the length
of time between appraisals for each real estate asset. This can only be the case if the ex ante
annual return variance for each real estate asset does not change with time.
17 Cf. Note 3.
18 A simple formula relates relative appraisal error to absolute appraisal error provided the
magnitude of relative appraisal error is reasonably small: d 5 ln(V*) 2 ln(V) 5 ln(V*/V) 5
ln((V 1 V* 2 V)/V) 5 ln(1 1 (V* 2 V)/V) < (V* 2 V)/V, provided that (V* 2 V)/V is
reasonably close to zero, e.g., less than 15% in magnitude.
19 It would be unrealistic to test the hypothesis that the probability distribution for absolute
appraisal error is constant across the universe of real estate assets, since this hypothesis would
imply that relative appraisal accuracy varies inversely with asset value. For example, if the
standard deviation of absolute appraisal error were $100,000, then the hypothesis would imply
that the standard deviation of relative appraisal error is approximately 10% in the case of a $1
million property but only 0.01% in the case of a $1 billion property. Similarly, if the standard
deviation of absolute appraisal error were $4,000,000, then the hypothesis would imply that the
standard deviation of relative appraisal error is approximately 2% in the case of $200 million
property but 200% in the case of a $2 million property. Such extreme variations in relative
appraisal error are impossible to reconcile with vast investment industry experience with
appraisal accuracy, and also are contradicted by the data in this study.RANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 51
20 A growing body of research suggests that stable fat-tailed distributions are more appropriate
models for investment returns than normal distributions (e.g., Young and Graff, 1995; and Graff,
Harrington and Young, 1997) in the case of real estate returns. However, this research does not
conﬂict with a vast body of experience in both the natural and social sciences suggesting that
normal and log-normal distributions are the appropriate models in general for measurement
error.
21 For example, the assumption that the probability distribution of e(p,t,n) has mean value zero
implies that any appraisal bias is contained in h(p,t). Thus, the assumption that h(p,t)i s
independent of appraiser for simultaneous appraisals of the same asset implies that any bias in
the appraisals of property p at time t is the same for each appraisal. This implication of the
null hypothesis is testable, and is examined in the next section.
22 Graff and Webb (1997) implies that the cross-sectional distribution of the deterministic
component is fat-tailed and gives rise to the fat-tailed asset returns observed in Young and Graff
(1995) and Graff, Harrington and Young (1997). The Graff and Webb study concludes that the
nonrandom nature of this component only becomes apparent at the individual asset level when
all investment information about each asset and agency information about asset management is
available for detailed investment analysis, although information about nonrandom appraisal error
at the individual asset level can be inferred from statistical tests of individual appraisal-based
return series for nonrandom performance persistence.
23 Since true asset value and the deterministic component of appraisal error are functional values
rather than random variables, it follows that s(ln(V*(p,t,z))) [ s(e). In other words, the only
random variable on the right side of Equation (2) is the random appraisal error component, so
the standard deviation of total appraisal error equals the standard deviation of the random
appraisal error component.
24 By contrast, since the deterministic component appears random in aggregate analysis of
appraisal-based returns, routine data analysis substantially overestimates the magnitude of
random appraisal error by incorporating variations in the deterministic component into the
estimate. This mistake has material consequences for institutional investor returns. Excessive
agency costs can be eliminated by appropriately structured controls on portfolio managers [for
example, see Graff and Webb (1997) for suggestions on performance measures designed to
detect the effect of excessive agency costs on investment return series]. Thus, our results imply
that previous real estate investment research has inadvertently encouraged passive investor
reactions to excessive agency costs by misinterpreting the aggregate statistical effect of these
costs as random appraisal error.
25 Since this is a nonparametric test, the conclusion follows even if the standard deviation for
random appraisal error varies with respect to time and/or across the asset universe.
26 If V and V are simultaneous appraisals of the same asset, then s(V , V ) 5 uV 2 V u/ ** * ** * 12 12 1 2
, where s(V , V ) is the sample standard deviation for the appraisal pair. In other words, Ï2* * 12
the sample standard deviation in the case of two appraisals is simply the absolute value of the
difference between the appraisals divided by . It follows that the distribution of sample Ï2
standard deviations for appraisal pairs is equivalent to the distribution of unsigned differences
between appraisal pairs. It will be shown in the next section that an examination of the unsigned
differences between appraisal pairs is more productive in the case of our data set than an
examination of the corresponding signed differences.
27 This is consistent with the observation in Young and Graff (1995) that 1991 appraisal-based
returns display cross-sectional distributional characteristics inconsistent with characteristics
displayed by appraisal-based returns in other years. That study attributes exceptional
distributional behavior of 1991 returns to transactional market gridlock, which made it difﬁcult52 JOURNAL OF REAL ESTATE RESEARCH
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for appraisers to extrapolate from fewer-than-usual transactions to prices for properties that were
not sold. That explanation can also account for the exceptional uncertainties observed in the
present study for a signiﬁcant fraction of 1991 and 1992 appraisals.
28 The null hypothesis is rejected at the 5% level for below-median sample standard deviations
in ﬁve of the nine cases of annual data. These cases all involve much smaller sample sets than
the aggregated data cases, and the rejections are borderline. Since these rejections include the
years (1991–1992) of greatest appraisal uncertainty, this could signal the existence of a small
amount of time-dependence in the data that vanishes when data are aggregated across a real
estate cycle.
29 This implies that it is inappropriate to attempt to estimate standard appraisal error by
computing the sample standard deviation of the set of differences between external and internal
appraisals and dividing the result by , cf. Note 26. The problem with this approach is that Ï2
appraisal differences that are closer to zero cannot be samples from the same probability
distribution as appraisal differences that are farther away from zero, since smaller-magnitude
differences are as likely to be negative as positive, whereas larger-magnitude differences are
biased in the positive direction. In fact, it is straightforward to show that the expected sample
variance of the set of differences between external and internal appraisals equals the variance
of random appraisal error multiplied by 2 plus one-half the average squared difference between
external and internal deterministic appraisal components.
30 Individual internal appraisals do show conservative bias in cases that present identiﬁable
exceptional risk factors, such as large single-tenant properties approaching lease expiration in
soft rental markets with tenants whose prospects for lease renewal appear uncertain, and assets
in areas that are in a regional economic decline (e.g., oil patch properties that provided the
impetus for internal appraisals).
31 Observation of this phenomenon provided the impetus for RREEF to institute the
simultaneous appraisal system, cf. the data description section. RREEF has observed that fee
appraisers seem unwilling to assume negative market rental growth rates. This results in upward
appraisal bias in speciﬁc economic situations such as the oil patch properties in the 1980s,
although not in most economic circumstances. As noted, Hendershott and Kane (1995) observed
this type of systematic upward bias in ofﬁce property appraisals from the second half of the
1980s.
32 Under the assumption that random appraisal error is normally distributed, sample variance in
the case of two error samples has a chi-square distribution with one degree of freedom, and the
cumulative probability of the distribution has a simple integral representation (e.g., see Hogg
and Craig, 1978). Since sample standard deviation is the square root of sample variance, this
immediately yields a corresponding integral for the cumulative probability of the sample
standard deviation with one degree of freedom in terms of the following piecewise continuously
differentiable probability density function ƒ: ƒ(t) 5 0 for t , 0, and ƒ(t) 5 (/ Ï2
(s ))exp(2t2/(2s2)) for t $ 0, where s is the true standard deviation. It follows that the Ïp
median value for the distribution of sample standard deviations is the solution c to the integral
equation 0.5 5 (/ ( s ))* exp(2t2/(2s2))dt, i.e., c 5 0.67448952s to eight signiﬁcant c Ï2 Ïp 0
ﬁgures.
33 Cf. Note 27.
34 For these periods, the median sample standard deviation for our data from the years 1991–
1992 can be used to estimate the standard deviation of random appraisal error, i.e.,
1.4826027*3.67% 5 5.42%.
35 For example, see Kendall and Stuart (1963). Minor technical constraints must also be imposed
on the probability density function for this result to be valid. The function ƒ must be square
integrable, piecewise continuously differentiable and continuously differentiable at jp. Note 32RANDOM APPRAISAL ERROR IN COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE VALUATION 53
implies that the density function for the sample standard deviation with one degree of freedom
satisﬁes these constraints provided that jp Þ 0.
36 This assertion comes with caveats. For example, as noted, the results of Diaz (1997) and Diaz
and Wolverton (1998) together suggest that valuation expertise on the part of appraisal
professionals is limited geographically.
37 It is currently popular among real estate professionals and academics to argue that
consolidation of real estate investment management functions reduces investor costs through
economies of scale with no loss of efﬁciency at the portfolio management or asset management
level. However, these assertions bear a striking resemblance to the concepts promoted by 1960s
advocates of conglomeration to justify the assemblage of corporate hodgepodges. Vogel (1997)
and Campbell, Ghosh and Sirmans (1998) discuss some shortcomings of recent real estate
consolidations also cf. Note 35.
38 If total appraisal error appears random when viewed cross-sectionally, then both total and
deterministic appraisal error have apparent standard deviations, and the apparent magnitude of
deterministic appraisal error is given by snr 5 (s 2 s ) , where stot is the apparent sample 2 2 1/2
tot r
standard deviation of appraisal error, sr is the sample standard deviation of random appraisal
error and snr is the apparent sample standard deviation of nonrandom albeit nonlinear appraisal
error. Based on the Miles, Guilkey, Webb and Hunter (1991) estimate stot < 10.00% and the
estimate sr < 2.00% from the present study, it follows from the above formula that snr < 9.80%.
39 For example, Graff and Webb (1997) presents evidence that a signiﬁcant component of
nonrandom appraisal error is due to the impact of excessive transaction-based agency costs on
subsequent appraisal valuations. The study also suggests how excessive agency costs can be
detected and eliminated by appropriately structured management control systems, and designs
a statistically-based mechanism to detect unusually large agency costs in appraisal-based returns.
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